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End-of-Life Care for Federally
Incarcerated Individuals in Canada
Adelina Iftene & Jocelyn Downie*
In this article, we review the current legislation, policies, and practices related to endof-life care for federally incarcerated individuals as set out in statutes, guidelines, and
government reports and documents that were
either publicly available or obtained through
Access to Information requests from the Parole Board of Canada and Correctional Service of Canada (CSC). Based on this review,
we describe the status quo, identify gaps,
and offer reflections and raise concerns regarding end-of-life care for federally incarcerated individuals. We conclude that there
are significant information gaps about the
number of people seeking end-of-life care
and about how CSC is managing the provision of such care. The sparse information
available is nonetheless sufficient to support
the conclusion that there are good reasons
to be concerned about how end-of-life care
is regulated, monitored, recorded, and provided. Significant reforms are needed.

*

Dans cet article, nous passons en revue la
législation, les politiques et les pratiques actuelles relatives aux soins de fin de vie des
personnes incarcérées dans des établissements fédéraux, tel que définies dans les
lois, les lignes directrices et les rapports et
documents gouvernementaux accessibles au
public ou obtenus par le biais de demandes
d'accès à l'information de la Commission
des libérations conditionnelles du Canada et du Service correctionnel du Canada
(SCC). Sur la base de cet examen, nous décrivons le statu quo, identifions les lacunes,
proposons des réflexions et soulevons des
préoccupations concernant les soins de fin
de vie pour les personnes incarcérées dans
les prisons fédérales. Nous concluons qu'il
existe des lacunes importantes en matière
d'information sur le nombre de personnes
qui demandent des soins de fin de vie et sur
la façon dont le SCC gère la prestation de
ces soins. Les rares informations disponibles
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sont néanmoins suffisantes pour étayer la conclusion selon laquelle il existe de bonnes raisons de s'inquiéter de la manière dont les soins de fin de vie sont réglementés, contrôlés,
enregistrés et fournis. Des réformes importantes sont nécessaires.
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Introduction
Each year, how many federally incarcerated individuals die a natural
death? What clinical options are available to them at the end of their lives?
How many of them seek palliative care, refuse potentially life-sustaining
care, or seek palliative sedation? How does the federal correctional system
respond to their requests? Are incarcerated individuals eligible for medical
assistance in dying (MAiD)? Do they seek it in significant numbers? Is the
federal correctional system well-equipped to deal with MAiD? All of these
questions are critical to an assessment of how well Correctional Service of
Canada (CSC) serves federally incarcerated individuals at particularly vulnerable moments in their lives.
Attempting to provide such an assessment, we embarked upon a review
of the current legislation, policies, and practices related to end-of-life care
set out in statutes, guidelines, and government reports and documents that
were available either publicly or through Access to Information requests
from the Parole Board of Canada (PBC) and CSC. More specifically, we
reviewed all pertinent federal legislation, directives, regulations, and guidelines, as well as the mortality reviews and reports related to death in prison
from the last 10 years, from CSC and the Office of the Correctional Investigator (OCI). The OCI is the independent ombudsperson for federally sentenced individuals. It investigates individual complaints and reviews CSC
policies and procedures to address systemic issues. The OCI’s annual and
special reports are the most important and complete sources of unbiased
information available. Finally, we reviewed the few relevant medical and
socio-legal articles that have emerged in the last decade. In particular, we
drew extensively on findings from a study with 197 aging incarcerated individuals facing significant physical and mental illnesses. The study was conducted in seven male penitentiaries and was based on structured interviews
with the participants. The study sought to identify gaps between the needs of
aging persons and the health care available in prisons. The results were analyzed using both quantitative and qualitative methodologies, and confirmed
the fact that there is an increasing need for specialized health care, including
end-of-life care among the prison population, and that CSC is ill-equipped
to address these needs in a manner that conforms with international and
national health standards and human rights.1

1

For the full description of the study and its methodology, see Adelina Iftene,
Punished for Aging: Vulnerabilities, Rights, and Access to Justice in Canadian
Penitentiaries (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2019) at 22–32.
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Based on this review, we describe the status quo, offer reflections, and
raise concerns regarding end-of-life care for federally incarcerated individuals.
In Part I, we provide demographic data about those federally incarcerated individuals who may want palliative care, who may wish to refuse
potentially life-sustaining care (requiring the withholding or withdrawal of
such care), and who may request palliative sedation or MAiD. We explore
the absolute number and proportion of incarcerated individuals over the age
of 50, the prevalence of diseases amongst incarcerated individuals, as well
as the number of natural deaths that occur in federal custody. Part II demonstrates that, in the future, a significant and growing number of federally
incarcerated individuals may request end-of-life care.
We then review how these requests might be met by delivering such
care in the community (i.e., removing the individual from correctional facilities2). This requires an explanation of how CSC utilizes its statutory
authority to consider alternatives to incarceration in response to an individual’s ill health (including temporary absence,3 parole by exception,4 and
the Royal Prerogative of Mercy5). We expose difficulties with all of these
mechanisms. Part III demonstrates that a significant and growing number
of individuals who want end-of-life care experience their illness and die
in correctional facilities. We offer reflections and raise concerns about the
deficiencies in the mechanisms for release into community.
We also review how requests for end-of-life care are met by delivering
such care in correctional facilities. First, we review the regulation and provision of palliative care inside correctional facilities. Then, because palliative
care cannot relieve the suffering for all patients and not everyone wants or
has access to palliative care, we review the regulation and provision of the
various other forms of end-of-life care. Specifically, we discuss withholding and withdrawal of potentially life-sustaining care (including potentially
life-sustaining treatment as well as oral hydration and nutrition), palliative

2

“Correctional facilities” include prisons and CSC regional hospitals.

3

See Corrections and Conditional Release Act, SC 1992, c 20, s 115.

4

See ibid, s 121.

5

See Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, ss 748–748.1.
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sedation, and MAiD. We offer reflections and raise concerns about the current state of end-of-life care in Canadian correctional facilities.
In the end, we conclude that there are significant information gaps about
the number of people in seeking end-of-life care, and about how CSC is
managing the provision of these services both in correctional facilities and
in community. The sparse information available is nonetheless sufficient to
support the conclusion that there are good reasons to be concerned regarding the manner in which end-of-life care is regulated, provided, recorded,
and monitored. Significant reforms are needed.

I. Terminology
Terminology in this area is contentious and hotly contested. For example, are palliative care and MAiD distinct or can MAiD be a part of
palliative care? Is MAiD a form of end-of-life care (given that one does not
need to be at the end of life to be eligible for MAiD in Canada)? Is voluntary
stopping eating and drinking a form of suicide or withholding of care? We
cannot hope to resolve these terminological debates in this paper. Fortunately, we do not need to do so as none of our arguments turn on the definitions.
Therefore, we need only to stipulate definitions for the sake of clarity but we
do not need to defend them.
For our purposes, it is sufficient to do two things. First, acknowledge
that there is overlap between the categories of end-of-life care that we set
out. Second, stipulate definitions of the key terms:
End-of-life care – a) care that is provided to individuals when they are
at the end of life or facing life-limiting conditions; and b) care that ends a
person’s life.
Palliative care – “an approach that improves the quality of life of patients and their families facing the problem associated with life-threatening
illness, through the prevention and relief of suffering by means of early
identification and impeccable assessment and treatment of pain and other
problems, physical, psychosocial and spiritual.”6

6

“WHO Definition of Palliative Care” (last visited 16 February 2020), online:
World Health Organization <www.who.int/cancer/palliative/definition/en/>
[perma.cc/W2MB-ALJP].
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Withdrawal of potentially life-sustaining care – ceasing care that has
the potential to sustain a person’s life (this includes medical interventions
including artificial nutrition and hydration as well as personal care such as
providing with food and liquids).
Withholding potentially life-sustaining care – refraining from commencing care that has the potential to sustain a person’s life (this includes
medical interventions including artificial nutrition and hydration as well as
personal care such as providing with food and liquids).
Palliative sedation – “the intentional administration of sedative medication to reduce a patient’s level of consciousness, with the intent to alleviate suffering at the end of life. It includes both intermittent and continuous
sedation, as well as both superficial and deep sedation. It may be accompanied by the withdrawal of artificial hydration and nutrition.”7
Medical assistance in dying – “(a) the administering by a medical
practitioner or nurse practitioner of a substance to a person, at their request,
that causes their death; or (b) the prescribing or providing by a medical
practitioner or nurse practitioner of a substance to a person, at their request,
so that they may self-administer the substance and in doing so cause their
own death.”8

II. Catalysts for Requests for End-of-Life Care Among
Federally Incarcerated Individuals

A.

Age

Prison populations are aging. The absolute number of people admitted
to prison over the age of 50 has increased over the last decade by 39%,9 despite the fact that the overall number of admissions to prison has decreased

7

See Carter v Canada (AG), 2012 BCSC 886 at para 42 [Carter].

8

Criminal Code, supra note 5, s 241.

9

See Public Safety Canada, Corrections and Conditional Release Statistical
Overview, 2017 Annual Report (Ottawa: Public Safety Canada Portfolio Corrections Statistics Committee, 2018) at 43–44 [Public Safety Canada, 2017
Annual Report].
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slightly.10 The proportion of individuals in Canadian federal correctional
institutions aged 50 or older at admission has also increased from 10.1%
in 2007–2008 to 16.4% in 2014–2015.11 In 2016–2017, 24.7% of federally
incarcerated individuals were aged 50 or over.12 46% of federally incarcerated individuals are serving life or indeterminate sentences and thus will
continue to age in prison.13
This absolute and relative aging of the federal corrections population can be explained by a multitude of factors that include: increased use of
“tough on crime” policies that have resulted in more mandatory minimum
sentences, longer sentences, more people serving indeterminate sentences
under the designation of “dangerous offender”,14 and tougher criteria for
release.15
It is reasonable to assume that the number of incarcerated people over
50 will remain significant and continue to grow over the coming years. It is
particularly important to attend to this phenomenon given that the average

10

See ibid at 37.

11

See Canada, Office of the Correctional Investigator, Annual Report of the Office of the Correctional Investigator 2014-2015 (Ottawa: OCI, 2015) at 11 [Office of the Correctional Investigator, Annual Report 2015].

12

See Public Safety Canada, 2017 Annual Report, supra note 9 at 47.

13

See Adelina Iftene, “The Pains of Incarceration: Aging, Rights and Policy in
Federal Penitentiaries” (2017) 59:1 Can J Criminol & Crim 63 at 68 [Iftene,
“Pains of Incarceration”].

14

If an individual is found guilty of three or more violent offences in his lifetime,
he or she can be given the designation of “dangerous offender” upon sentencing and receive an indeterminate sentence. That means that similar to that of
those serving life sentence, even if eventually released from prison, they will
continue to serve their sentence under supervision in the community, for the
rest of their life. Though entitled to apply for parole at regular intervals, many
people serving indeterminate sentences serve long periods of time behind bars.
See Criminal Code, supra note 5, ss 752, 761(1); Public Safety Canada, 2017
Annual Report, supra note 9 at 107.

15

See e.g. the changes brought about by the passing of the Safe Streets and Community Act, SC 2012, c 1 cited in Adelina Iftene & Allan Manson, “Recent
Crime Legislation and the Challenge for Prison Health Care” (2013) 185:1
CMAJ 886 at 887. See also Protecting Canadians by Ending Sentence Discounts for Multiple Murders Act, SC 2011, c 5, which allows for periods of
incarceration without possibility of parole of up to 75 years.
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age at time of natural death in custody is 6016 (in contrast to the Canadian
average of the general population at 82).17

B. Prevalence of disease
The leading causes of death are: cancer (36%), cardiovascular-related
(29%) and respiratory-related (11%).18 Individuals in federal prisons have
higher disease prevalence than non-incarcerated individuals. There is a
higher prevalence of blood-borne diseases (such as hepatitis C and HIV),
cardiovascular disease, diabetes, asthma, and other respiratory diseases in
incarcerated populations than in community populations.19
Among non-incarcerated populations, the most common underlying
medical condition for individuals referred for palliative care is cancer (70–
80%).20 The most common underlying medical circumstances for individuals who received MAiD between 1 January and 31 October 2018 were cancer (64%), neuro-degenerative (11%), circulatory/respiratory system (16%),
and other/unknown (9%).21
Given this data, it is reasonable to assume that requests for palliative
care and MAiD will be made by some federally incarcerated individuals.

16

See Canada, Office of the Correctional Investigator, Annual Report of the Office of the Correctional Investigator 2017-2018 (Ottawa: OCI, 2018) at 28 [Office of the Correctional Investigator, Annual Report 2018].

17

See Statistics Canada, Archived – Life Expectancy and Other Elements of the
Life Table, Canada and Provinces, Table 39-10-0007-01 (Ottawa: Statistics
Canada, 2018), online: <www150.statcan.gc.ca> [perma.cc/U3JF-LE5P].

18

See Correctional Service Canada, Annual Report on Deaths in Custody
2015/2016 (Ottawa: CSC 2017), Table 6 [Correctional Service Canada, Annual Report 2017].

19

See Fiona Kouyoumdjian et al, “Health Status of Prisoners in Canada: Narrative Review” (2016) 62:3 Can Fam Physician 215 at 217–18.

20

See Graeme Rocker, James Downar & R Sean Morrison, “Palliative Care for
Chronic Illness: Driving Change” (2016) 188:17–18 CMAJ E493 at E493.

21

See Health Canada, “Fourth Interim Report on Medical Assistance in Dying”
(2019) at 6, online (pdf): <www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/publications/health-system-services/medical-assistance-dying-interim-reportapril-2019.html> [perma.cc/L9H3-ELE9].
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C. Mortality
Approximately 66% of all deaths in custody are “natural deaths” (defined in contrast to “non-natural deaths”, which include suicide, homicide, accident, overdose, staff intervention, and deaths from undetermined
causes).22 In its latest report, the OCI noted that in 2017–2018 there were 39
natural deaths in custody (accounting for 71% of all deaths).23
Of course, some of the natural deaths would not have been candidates
for end-of-life care as, “36% of the natural cause deaths were deemed ‘unexpected’ – the result of sudden cardiac arrest, complications arising from
medical procedures, or rapid disease progression.”24 It is not clear what
percentage of this 36% were so sudden as to render end-of-life care (e.g.,
withdrawal of potentially life-sustaining treatment) irrelevant. In addition,
some of the non-natural deaths (accident, suicide, etc.) would have been
candidates for end-of-life care as these are not all immediate deaths. Manner
of death is determined by reference to whatever initiated the chain of events
ending in death so considerable time can pass between the non-natural initiation (e.g. accident) and death – leaving the potential for requests for endof-life care.

D. Summary
Based on these statistics about age, prevalence of disease, and mortality in prisons, it is reasonable to conclude that a significant and growing
number of incarcerated individuals may desire end-of-life care. They may
want these services in the community or, if that is not possible, within correctional facilities. We consider each in turn.

22

See Correctional Service Canada, Annual Report 2017, supra note 18 at 5–6
(“death in custody” is defined as a death occurring in a federal correctional
facility).

23

See Office of the Correctional Investigator, Annual Report 2018, supra note 16
at 27.

24

Office of the Correctional Investigator, Annual Report 2015, supra note 11 at 21.

10

McGill Journal of Law and Health
Revue de droit et santé de McGill

Vol. 14
No. 1

III. Access to End-of-Life Care in Community
The Corrections and Conditional Release Act25 (CCRA) and the Criminal Code26 have been interpreted by the OCI as establishing that CSC has
a responsibility to seek alternatives to incarceration for “a palliative or terminally ill individual.”27 This OCI statutory interpretation has not been rejected or disputed by CSC. With this responsibility in mind, we now explore
how federally incarcerated individuals can be released into community for
care and how well the systems for release are working for individuals who
want end-of-life care in community.

A. In theory
In theory, there are three potential pathways to receive care in community rather than in prison for individuals who are not eligible for regular
parole: temporary absence, parole by exception, and the Royal Prerogative
of Mercy. We consider each in turn.
1. Temporary absence
Under the Commissioner’s Directive 710-3 (in turn under the authority of the CCRA28, the Corrections and Conditional Release Regulations29,
and the Criminal Code30), “temporary absences may be granted for the following purposes: medical reasons, to allow the inmate to undergo medical
examination or treatment that is not provided in the penitentiary...”31 They
can, in theory, be for an unlimited time. There are two types of tempor-

25

Supra note 3, s 121.

26

Supra note 5, ss 748–748.1.

27

Correctional Investigator of Canada, An Investigation of the Correctional Service’s Mortality Review Process, by the Office of the Correctional Investigator
(Ottawa: CIC, 18 December 2013) at 7 [Office of the Correctional Investigator,
Mortality Review Process].

28

Supra note 3, ss 17, 115.

29

SOR/92-620, ss 9, 155 [Corrections Regulations].

30

Supra note 5, s 746.1(2).

31

Correctional Service Canada, “Temporary Absences” (1 June 2016), Commis-
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ary absences: escorted and unescorted. All incarcerated individuals are eligible for escorted temporary absences for medical purposes no matter the
length of their sentence or how much time they have served. Subject to two
exceptions,32 incarcerated individuals are eligible for unescorted absences
for medical purposes when they have served a sufficient portion of their
sentence.33 The criteria for temporary absences are the following:
a. an inmate will not, by reoffending, present an undue risk to society
during the absence
b. it is desirable for the inmate to be absent from the institution for one
of the reasons for which temporary absences may be granted
c. the inmate’s behaviour while under sentence does not preclude authorizing the absence
d. a structured plan for the absence, has been prepared.34
The assessment of an application for a temporary absence includes the following steps:
a. review the application against the objectives of the Correctional
Plan

sioner’s Directive No 710-3, s 6 (Ottawa: CSC, 1 June 2016) [Commissioner’s
Directive 710-3].
32

See ibid, s 9. The execeptions identified in Commissioner’s Directive 710-3,
supra note 31 are, a) cases in which indeterminate sentences are imposed for
offences that occurred prior to 1 August 1997; b) cases in which life and indeterminate sentences are followed by determinate sentences. An indivdiual
falling within one of these categories is not eligible for an unescorted absence.

33

See Commissioner’s Directive 710-3, supra note 31, s 8. A “sufficient portion
of the sentence” means, “a) in the case of a life sentence, other than a person
who was under the age of eighteen at the time of commission of the offence of
murder, the portion of the sentence to be served to reach the inmate’s full parole
eligibility date less three years; b) in the case of a sentence of incarceration for
an indeterminate period, the portion of the sentence to be served to reach the inmate’s full parole eligibility date less three years; c) in all other cases, one-half
of the period required to be served before the inmate’s full parole eligibility
date, or six months, whichever is the greater.”

34

Ibid, s 21.
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b. interview the inmate to discuss the proposed temporary absence
c. review the inmate’s progress against the Correctional Plan, assess
the level of risk involved in the proposed absence and the need for
the imposition of conditions pursuant to subsection 17(2) of the
CCRA, in the case of an ETA, or subsection 161(2) of the CCRR, in
the case of a UTA, in order to manage the risk
d. request, if applicable, a Community Assessment or a Community
Strategy. In cases of UTAs of more than 72 hours, a Community
Strategy must be requested.
e. review victim information as well as any victim statement(s) provided pursuant to subsection 133(3.1) of the CCRA.35
A maximum of 30–60 days is allowed for the parole or correctional officer
who receives the request for temporary absence to complete an “assessment
for decision.” Then up to ten days is allowed for the “institutional head
decision,” and an unspecified length of time for review and appeal. Thus, a
decision on a request for a temporary absence could be made quickly or it
could take up to 70 days and more if there is an appeal.36
The feasibility of temporary absences hinges on the costs (especially
costs associated with the need for an escort) as well as the willingness and
ability of CSC to secure health care services and a bed in the community.

35

Ibid, s 22. It is important to note here that the potential impact of the release
of the incarcerated individual on the victim is not a factor considered in the
determination of whether the individual should be released. Rather, the CCRA
simply establishes the authority to impose conditions on the release that are
considered reasonable and necessary to protect the victim. We do not, in this
article, engage in the debate about whether the impact on the victim should
have any role in the decision whether to release an individual for the purpose
of accessing end-of-life care. That would require a lengthy exploration of a
controversial issue of general application – an important issue which is outside
the scope of this article.

36

See ibid. See Adelina Iftene, “The Case for a New Compassionate Release
Provision” (2017) 54:4 Alb L Rev 929 [Iftene, “Case for a New Compassionate Release Provision”] (However, as of 2017, “the Federal Court has only
heard two judicial reviews of negative PBC decisions. Neither were based on
a request for release due to medical issues, but were rather grounded in section 121(d): release while awaiting deportation” at 936. Thus appeals of parole
board deicsions are rare).
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As sole providers, CSC is responsible for the health care of federally incarcerated individuals, no matter where that care is being delivered. As a
practical matter, therefore, the possibility and length of any kind of medical
temporary absence will depend in part on whether CSC can and will make
arrangements for health care provision in the community. Unsurprisingly,
temporary absences may be impossible or unlikely for CSC to grant due to
the unavailability of health care services and beds. In addition, escorts can
be prohibitively expensive. Individuals seeking end-of-life care however,
are likely to be physically weak, require assistance with daily activities and
therefore less likely to require an escort to keep them from escaping.
2. Parole by exception
Parole is a process through which service of a sentence is shifted from
prison to community. In Canada there is no sentence without possibility of
parole. All offenders will eventually become eligible to apply for parole.
However, obtaining parole is not guaranteed even where an individual is eligible. Indeed, some offenders spend most or all of their sentence in prison.
If an offender is serving a determinate sentence (i.e., not a life sentence), they are eligible to apply for parole after serving one-third of their
sentence.37 Barring exceptional circumstances they are entitled to “statutory
release” after serving two-thirds of their sentence. Incarcerated individuals
can nonetheless be denied statutory release because it has been established
that they are “likely to commit, before the expiry of his/her sentence, an offence causing death or serious harm, a serious drug offence or a sex offence
involving a child”38 and be required to serve their entire sentence or die in
custody. If an offender is serving an indeterminate sentence39 or some form
of life sentence,40 they are eligible to apply for parole after serving seven
years. If they are serving a life sentence for second or third degree murder, they can apply for parole after 10–25 years for second degree murder41

37

See Corrections and Conditional Release Act, supra note 3, s 120(1).

38

Ibid, supra note 3, s 129(2).

39

See Criminal Code, supra note 5, s 761(1).

40

See Corrections and Conditional Release Act, supra note 3, s 120(2).

41

See Criminal Code, supra note 5, s 745(c).
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and 25 years for first degree murder.42 There is no statutory release for life
sentences. An incarcerated individual is eligible to apply for day parole six
months before his or her full parole eligibility date.43 Day parole is a precondition of full parole.
The overarching principles of parole are set out in section 102 of the
CCRA:
a. the offender will not, by reoffending, present an undue risk to society before the expiration according to law of the sentence the offender is serving; and
b. the release of the offender will contribute to the protection of society by facilitating the reintegration of the offender into society as a
law-abiding citizen.44
The main eligibility criteria for both day parole (when the individual may
go into community during certain day hours and return to prison in the
evening) and full parole (where the individual lives fully in the community,
under supervision) are set out in the CCRA and the Criminal Code.
Once the eligibility criteria are met, the individual may apply to the
Parole Board of Canada (PBC) for early release. The criteria that the PBC
will consider before making their decision are fleshed out in the DecisionMaking Policy Manual for Board Members (“Policy Manual”) under Assessment for Pre-Release Decisions under the following categories:45
•

Actuarial measures of the risk to re-offend;

•

Criminal, social and conditional release history;

•

Factors affecting self-control;

42

See ibid, s 745(a).

43

See Corrections and Conditional Release Act, supra note 3, s 119(c).

44

Ibid, s 102.

45

See Parole Board of Canada, “Decision-Making Policy Manual for Board
Members”, 2nd ed (Ottawa: PBC, 2019), s 2.1, online: <www.canada.ca/
en/parole-board/corporate/publications-and-forms/decision-making-policymanual-for-board-members.html> [perma.cc/R36J-FXGU] [Parole Board of
Canada, “Policy Manual”].
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Responsivity to programming and interventions;

•

Institutional and community behaviour;

•

Offender change;

•

Release plan and community supervision strategies.

15

Often, incarcerated individuals are not released when they become eligible
to apply for parole. In 2016–2017, 64.4% of all releases from federal prisons were statutory releases (almost 60% for non-Indigenous people and
78% for Indigenous people).46 The average time served before early release
was 45.3% of the sentence for non-Indigenous people and 49% for Indigenous people.47 Finally, in 2016–2017, 131 individuals were serving their entire sentence in prison under detention.48 These numbers do not account for
the individuals serving a life sentence who may wait decades before early
release or who die in custody.
Under section 121 of the CCRA,49 some federally incarcerated individuals are eligible to apply for parole before they reach their parole application and statutory release eligibility dates mentioned above, through what is
commonly known as “parole by exception” (shifting service of the sentence
from prison to the community in exceptional circumstances). This eligibility extends to an individual:
a. Who is terminally ill;50

46

See Public Safety Canada, 2017 Annual Report, supra note 9 at 79.

47

See ibid at 89–92.

48

See ibid at 104.

49

See Corrections and Conditional Release Act, supra note 3, s 121.

50

“Terminally ill” is not defined in legislation or policy documents. See Parole Board of Canada, “Policy Manual”, supra note 45 (“a prognosis as to the
length of time an offender has left to live is not required” at Policy 4.3 at 2). See
e.g. R v Woods, 2003 BCCA 539 at paras 1, 11. See also R v Fleming, [2001]
203 Nfld & PEIR 309 at 52, 610 APR 309. In practice, however, based on the
materials sent by the PBC in response to an Access to Information Request and
how the PBC has dealt with applicants under s 121, it can be concluded that the
PBC is taking “terminal illness” to mean death is expected within 6 months.
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b. Whose physical or mental health is likely to suffer serious damage
if the offender continues to be held in confinement;
c. For whom continued confinement would constitute excessive hardship that was not reasonably foreseeable at the time the offender
was sentenced; or
d. Who is the subject of an order of surrender under the Extradition
Act and who is to be detained until surrendered.51
It must be noted that sections 121(b)–(d) do not apply to individuals:
a. serving a life sentence imposed as a minimum punishment or commuted from a sentence of death; or
b. serving, in a penitentiary, a sentence for an indeterminate period.52
Therefore, individuals serving life or indeterminate sentences are eligible
to apply for parole by exception only if they are terminally ill.53 Such individuals can only apply for temporary absence as explained above or for an
exercise of the Royal Prerogative of Mercy as explained below.
It should be noted here that incarcerated individuals seeking release into
community for end-of-life care will be eligible to be considered for parole
by exception because of their health conditions – sometimes (a) but often
(b) and (c) in the eligibility list above. Whether they will be granted parole
however, will depend on the same criteria for granting parole as set out in
the Policy Manual.54 These criteria appear to have little to do with the health
conditions of the individual. There is therefore, at least on paper, the potential for an individual to be denied release into the community to receive
palliative care on the grounds that, for example, he was considered nonresponsive to programming because he did not complete elements of his
correctional plan. In other words, an incarcerated individual who is eligible
to apply for parole by exception because of ill health could be denied parole
because of factors entirely unrelated to health. In addition, individuals who

51

Corrections and Conditional Release Act, supra note 3, s 121(1) a–c.

52

Ibid, s 121(2).

53

See ibid.

54

See Parole Board of Canada, “Policy Manual”, supra note 45.
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seek parole by exception are often very sick, and they may have been so for
many months or years prior. Thus, sometimes it may be physically impossible for these individuals to fulfill the regular requirements for parole (e.g.,
taking a program or making a plan for release); in such situations incarcerated individuals are denied parole for reasons that are directly a result of the
very poor health that leads them to apply for this exceptional form of release
in the first place.
Finally, neither the legislation nor the Policy Manual provides for an
expedited process for parole by exception and both are silent regarding any
timelines specific to this form of release. Absent any other guidance, the
parole-by-exception process is subject to the same timelines as regular parole: the legislation provides that the PBC should review a regular parole
application within six months of receiving it. This period can be extended
for an additional two months where the Board deems necessary.55

3. Royal Prerogative of Mercy
Under section 748 of the Criminal Code, individuals (even those serving life sentences and even if not terminally ill) may have their sentences
commuted. They may spend the remainder of their sentences under supervision in the community through the Royal Prerogative of Mercy.56 The
Royal Prerogative of Mercy is intended to respond to only “very exceptional
and truly deserving of cases.”57 A number of principles have been set out
to guide the exercise of the prerogative. The PBC identified the following
principles, among others:
[U]ndue hardship, which includes suffering of a mental,
physical and/or financial nature, must be out of proportion to
the nature and the seriousness of the offense and the resulting
consequences, and must be more severe than for other individuals in similar situations.
In general terms, the notions of injustice and hardship imply
that the suffering which is being experienced could not be fore-

55

See Corrections Regulations, supra note 29, s 158.

56

See Criminal Code, supra note 5, s 748.

57

Parole Board of Canada, Royal Prerogative of Mercy Ministerial Guidelines,
(Ottawa: PBC, 2014) at 3.
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seen at the time the sentence was imposed. In addition, there
must be clear evidence that the injustice and/or the hardship exceed the normal consequences of a conviction and sentence.58

And lastly,
CSC is responsible for the care and custody of inmates as
stipulated in section 5(a) of the CCRA and that responsibility
includes caring for the medical problems of all offenders, irrespective of their seriousness. Whereas illness or deteriorating health may cause hardship, it does not, in itself, constitute
a sufficient reason to grant a conditional pardon in advance
of eligibility for conditional release under the CCRA. For this
exceptional measure to be invoked, serious medical problems
would be considered as one of many factors.59

The Royal Prerogative of Mercy is only available when all other potential mechanisms (i.e., parole by exception, temporary absecences etc.) for
release have been unseuccesfully exhausted. Therefore, the process for release based on a Royal Pregative is particularly lengthy. Moreover, the Royal Prerogative is a fully discretionary mechanism and there are no timelines
within which such decisions must be made.

B. In practice
Very few federally incarcerated individuals are released through parole
by exception or an exercise of the Royal Prerogative of Mercy, and only a
minority of natural deaths occur through temporary absences spent in community hospitals.60

58

Ibid at 3.

59

Ibid at 6.

60

See Iftene, “Case for a New Compassionate Release Provision”, supra note 36
at 936. See also Canada, Office of the Correctional Investigator, Annual Report
of the Office of the Correctional Investigator 2013–2014, (Ottawa: OCI, 2014)
at 31.
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1. Temporary absence
The most common mechanism for receiving end-of-life care in community appears to be temporary absence. The OCI’s Annual Report 2015
revealed that, “nearly 60 [of 94 reviewed in lookback] of the natural cause
deaths involved individuals who were receiving palliative care (including
end-of-life) services. Of those palliative cases, 60% died in a CSC regional
hospital, 31% died in a community hospital, and 9% succumbed in a CSC
institution.”61 One can deduce from the data that 25% of the natural death
cases in which individuals were receiving palliative care involved temporary absences and 6% involved parole by exception.62
There is no data available about how long these individuals were in the
regional or community hospitals (i.e., whether were they transferred there to
receive care over an extended period of time or, more likely, transferred for
their final hours or days). Nor is there data available about where the nonpalliative natural death cases died.

2. Parole by exception
CSC has reported that between 2005–2015, 350 people died of natural
causes while in custody and most of these were expected deaths.63 During a
similar period of time (2007–2017) there were only 28 requests for parole
by exception.

61

Office of the Correctional Investigator, Annual Report 2015, supra note 11
at 21; see also Correctional Service Canada, Annual Report 2017, supra note
18 at 5 (this data is given under the heading “Natural Cause Deaths in Custody” yet CSC defined “death in custody” as a death occurring in a federal
correctional facility and community hospitals are not correctional facilities.
We are therefore assuming that these statistics refer to federally incarcerated
individuals still in custody as well as those given parole by exception for health
reasons).

62

Nineteen (31%) of the natural deaths receiving palliative care happened in
community hospital. Four of the 60 (6%) were granted parole by exception
while 15 (25%) were by temporary absence.

63

Correctional Service Canada, Annual Report 2017, supra note 18 at 6.

20

McGill Journal of Law and Health
Revue de droit et santé de McGill

Vol. 14
No. 1

21 of the 28 requests for parole by exception were granted during this
period.64 All of the requests were based on serious medical conditions: brain
injury, cancer, end-stage liver failure, Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis, mental
health, and some unspecified terminal illnesses. The requests granted were
for individuals with a terminal condition except in two situations in which
the PBC determined that the condition was not terminal but continued incarceration would amount to excessive hardship. The requests denied included
a case of end-stage liver failure with a poor prognosis requiring palliative
care, a terminal illness diagnosis with a prognosis of weeks to months, a
case of stage four cancer with a prognosis of weeks to a few months, and a
case of severe mental illness with suicidal ideation.65
CSC reports reveal a similarly low rate of parole by exception for individuals who ultimately die a natural or expected death. For example, the
OCI’s Annual Report 2015 noted that:
Parole by Exception (compassionate release) provisions of the
Corrections and Conditional Release Act were explored in 36
of 55 of the palliative care cases. Of those, 14 applications
were made to the Parole Board of Canada for review; only
4 were granted. In 19 of 55 palliative care cases, the rapid
course of illness did not allow sufficient time to explore alternatives to incarceration. Five inmates refused to submit an
exception request; for some their wish was to remain at a CSC
facility to receive end-of-life care.66

3. Royal Prerogative of Mercy
Reviewing data back to 2005, we found evidence of 49 requests for the
Royal Prerogative of Mercy (although it is unclear whether this number includes only illness-based requests). None of these requests were granted.67

64

See Parole Board of Canada, Parole by Exception 2007-2017, document obtained through an Access to Information Request A-2017-000021, February
2018 [Parole Board of Canada, “Parole by Exception”].

65

See ibid.

66

Office of the Correctional Investigator, Annual Report 2015, supra note 11 at 22.

67

See Office of the Correctional Investigator, Mortality Review Process, supra
note 27 at 5. See also Canada, Office of the Correctional Investigator, Annual
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We could not find a single instance of the Royal Prerogative of Mercy being
exercised to enable a federally incarcerated individual to receive end-of-life
care in the community.

C. Reflections and concerns
Given CSC’s responsibility to consider alternatives to incarceration for
“palliative or terminally ill offenders,”68 to support these individuals as they
apply for release on the grounds of poor health, and to ensure their safe transition to community or to community institutions,69 one might reasonably
ask why so few federally incarcerated individuals receive their palliative
care and die outside the prison context.
There is no evidence to enable us to meaningfully answer this question
in relation to denials of the Royal Prerogative of Mercy. We know that in
the two cases for which we found reasons for denial, the individuals were
considered too high risk to be released into community.70 We do not know
whether either of these cases involved requests based on health condition.
We do not know how many of the complete set of requests for the exercise
of the Royal Prerogative were based on illness. Nor do we know the reasons
for denial for the vast majority of the requests. However, the Royal Prerogative of Mercy can only be requested after all other avenues for release have
been exhausted and it can take significant amounts of time for those avenues
to be exhausted and then even longer for a request for the exercise of the
prerogative to be considered. Therefore, it may be that individuals simply
die before they are able to make such requests or to have them considered.
Furthermore, some evidence suggests that a lack of awareness among potentially eligible individuals may be a significant reason for the existence of
so few cases of the Royal Prerogative of Mercy in the health care context. In
a recent study of 197 individuals over the age of 50 who presented various

Report of the Office of the Correctional Investigator 2015-2016, (Ottawa: OCI,
2016) at 12.
68

Office of the Correctional Investigator, Mortality Review Process, supra note
27 at 23.

69

See ibid at 31–34.

70

See ibid at 5.
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rates of chronic, acute, and terminal illnesses, none of the participants were
aware that they could apply for the Royal Prerogative of Mercy.71
One could speculate that concerns about the cost of security escorts and
lack of availability of health care services and beds in community hospitals
play a part in the low rates of use of the mechanism of temporary absences.
One could also speculate that any lack of access to health care services and
beds in community hospitals may be due to an unwillingness on the part of
health care providers and institutions to take care of individuals in federal
custody. Furthermore, the length of time it can take to get a decision on an
application for a temporary absence may also play a part in the low rates (at
least for those individuals who are relatively near to death). However, there
is no evidence to justify offering anything more than speculation.72 Much
more evidence is needed about the use of temporary absences as a means of
accessing end-of-life care in the community.
There is some evidence to suggest that at least five kinds of deficiencies
in the parole by exception rules and practices at least partly explain the low
numbers of federally incarcerated individuals accessing end-of-life care in
community via parole by exception.
First, as demonstrated in the study mentioned above, there is a lack
of awareness regarding the option of applying for a Royal Prerogative.73
Second, section 121 is very restrictive. As explained above, individuals who
are serving life sentences are not eligible under this section unless they are
“terminally ill.”74

71

See Iftene, “Case for a New Compassionate Release Provision”, supra note 36
at 936.

72

While a comparative analysis is beyond the purpose of this paper, it is worth
noting that there is some limited information from other jurisdictions about
challenges in releasing sick individuals due to public perception and difficulties
securing a hospital bed. See e.g. John F Linder & Frederick J Meyers, “Palliative Care for Prison Inmates ‘Don’t Let Me Die in Prison’” (2007) 298:8
JAMA 894; Brie William & Rita Abraldes, “Growing Older: Challenges of
Prison and Re-Entry for the Aging Population,” in Robert B Greifinger, ed,
Public Health Behind Bars (New York: Springer, 2007) 56.

73

See ibid.

74

Corrections and Conditional Release Act, supra note 3, s 121(2).
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Third, an individual cannot apply for parole by exception without CSC’s
support. The parole officer must initiate the pre-release.75 As noted by the
Office of the Correctional Investigator (OCI), many potentially meritorious
requests are not brought before parole boards because caseworkers are unwilling or unable to go through the necessary administrative steps.76 Often,
even when the caseworker supports the application, the process is lengthy
and bureaucratic, and the applicant dies before their case is heard. As noted
above, the OCI Annual Report 2014–2015 reports that “[i]n 19 of 55 palliative cases, the rapid course of illness did not allow sufficient time to explore
alternatives to incarceration.”77 It is not clear whether this is because the
process of exploring alternatives took so long or the course of the illness
was truly precipitous.
Fourth, to be successful in a request for consideration for parole by exception, “substantive medical evidence” is required from the prison doctor
showing that the individual’s health is likely to suffer serious damage if the
person continues to be incarcerated or that continued incarceration would
constitute excessive hardship in the person’s circumstances.78 It is possible
that prison doctors are wary of supporting section 121 applications79 due to
the potential for professional liability.80 Moreover, the requests granted by
the PBC seem to be mostly grounded in section 121(1)(a) terminal illness.81
This is unsurprising as terms like “undue hardship” and “health likely to

75

See ibid, ss 55–60 (this means that the parole officer will have to assess the
best alternatives to incarceration. It is the parole officer who has to collect
the paperwork including the risk assessments, psychological assessments and
medical documentation. They must write their own assessment of the individual, compile recommendations for community options, contact family members and victim, etc.).

76

See Office of the Correctional Investigator, Annual Report 2015, supra note 11
at 24.

77

Ibid at 22.

78

Office of the Correctional Investigator, Mortality Review Process, supra note
27 at 23.

79

See Parole Board of Canada, “Parole by Exception”, supra note 64.

80

See Iftene, “Case for a New Compassionate Release Provision”, supra note 36
at 937; Canada, Office of the Correctional Investigator, Annual Report of the
Office of the Correctional Investigator 2010–2011 (Ottawa: OCI, 2011) at 34.

81

See Parole Board of Canada, “Parole by Exception”, supra note 64.
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suffer serious damage” are vague and there is no guidance on how CSC and
PBC are to interpret them, or what concrete evidence would be sufficient to
prove the individual meets these requirements. This lack of precision may
contribute to the bureaucratic challenges faced by those seeking timely release and undermine section 121 as a meaningful avenue for release.
Fifth, as noted above, once an individual has met the threshold for consideration for parole by exception under section 121, the criteria used by the
PBC to make their decisions seem unrelated to health. Rather, Commissioner’s Directive No 712-1 states that the PBC is to review all the documents
they would review for regular parole.82 The factors reviewed for regular
parole include the amount of time served in prison, type of conviction, completion of correctional programs, attitude during incarceration, availability
of a release plan, employment and housing for when released, and psychological and risk assessments.83 These factors are exceedingly problematic in
the context of release for grievous illness. This concern can be illustrated
through a review of the available data on parole by exception cases from
2007–2017.84 It is clear that, as one would expect, given the factors the
considered by PBC, that the regular parole factors (as opposed to health
concerns) are determinative in the cases considered under section 121. In
at least four of the seven rejected requests, there was evidence of terminal
or significant illness that could have justified the conclusion that continued
confinement would constitute excessive hardship. However, the reasons
listed for rejection by the PBC were related to the incarcerated individual’s
risk assessment, including, not having a viable release plan, not participating in programming to reduce risk while incarcerated, and the nature and
severity of the offence.85

82

Correctional Service Canada, Pre-Release Decision Making, Commissioner’s
Directive No 712-1 (Ottawa: CSC, 7 December 2015) at para 56.

83

See Kelly Hannah-Moffatt & Caroline Yule, “Gaining Insight, Changing Attitudes and Managing ‘Risk’: Parole Release Decisions for Women Convicted
of Violent Crimes” (2011) 13:2 Punishm Soc 149 at 157–59. See also Parole
Board of Canada, “Policy Manual”, supra note 45, ss 8–13; Renee Gobeil &
Ralph Serin, “Preliminary Evidence of Adaptive Decision-Making Techniques
Used by Parole Board Members” (2009) 8:2 Intl J Forensic Ment Health 97 at
100–01.

84

See Parole Board of Canada, “Parole by Exception”, supra note 64.
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See ibid.
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While safety is certainly a reasonable criterion to consider in granting
or denying parole, in the context of grievous illness, reintegration and rehabilitation seem distantly related to the merits of releasing an incarcerated
individual into the community for end-of-life care. Furthermore, it is unreasonable to base decisions on factors such as ‘program attendance’ where
the individual did not attend the programs due to the length of the waitlists
for the programs or the fact that their illness prevented them from doing so.
The low numbers of individuals receiving health care in community
through parole by exception may be explained by the fact that many individuals who are sick enough to qualify may also be too sick to push forward
an application.
In sum, when a federally incarcerated individual becomes terminally
ill, or continued confinement would constitute excessive hardship, or their
health is likely to further deteriorate due to incarceration,86 CSC has a responsibility to explore options for transfers to community. However, the
three mechanisms that would allow for such transfers appear to be of limited
use where the individuals desire treatment and to ultimately die in the community.
As has been demonstrated, a significant number of individuals are likely
to spend the course of their illness in federal prison, and they will want endof-life care. Therefore, we turn now to a consideration of end-of-life care
provided within Canadian correctional facilities.

IV. Access to End-of-Life Care in Federal Correctional
Facilities

A. Palliative care

1. In theory
CSC provides health care services for federally incarcerated individuals. It does so in its prisons, its own regional hospitals, and community
facilities. Provincial and territorial health ministries are not involved in fed-

86

See Corrections and Conditional Release Act, supra note 3, s 121(1).
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eral correctional health care, and federal facilities do not fall under the same
accreditation process as community facilities.87
The standards that CSC must meet in the implementation of health care
services come from a variety of sources. First, CSC has a duty under international standards and national statutes to provide incarcerated individuals
with health services comparable to those in the community. For instance,
Canada is signatory to the UN Basic Principles for Treatment of Prisoners88
and the Mandela Rules,89 both of which require that prisoners (sic) have access to the same health care services as those available in the community.
Second, in addition to its international and statutory obligations, CSC
is bound by a legal duty of care owed to those in its custody.90 This duty of
care dictates that the services available to incarcerated individuals must be
adequate at all times, regardless of comparable community services.91
Third, the CCRA and CCRR govern health matters for federally incarcerated individuals. Section 86 of the CCRA states that an individual must
have access to essential health care and reasonable access to non-essential
health care, both of which are to be provided at “professionally accepted
standards.”92 The legislation does not establish what constitutes “essential”
versus “non-essential health care” or what the standards are or how they

87

See Daniel Antonowicz & John Winterdyk, “A Review of Deaths in Custody in
Three Canadian Provinces” (2014) 56:1 Can J Criminol & Crim 85 at 89.

88

Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners, GA Res 45/111, UNGAOR
(1990) at Principle 9.

89

The United Nations Standard for Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules), GA Res 70/175, UNGAOR, 70th Sess, UN
Doc A/RES/70/175 (2015) at Rules 24–35.

90

See Criminal Code, supra note 5, s 197(1)-(i); Adelina Iftene, Lynne Hanson
& Allan Manson, “Tort Claims and Canadian Prisoners” (2014) 39:2 Queen’s
LJ 655 at 670–75; Levasseur v Canada, 2004 FC 976 at paras 70–71; Lipcsei
v Central Saanich (District of) (1994), 8 BCLR (3d) 325 (BCSC), [1995] 7
WWR 582 at para 16; Steele v Ontario, [1993] OJ No 2010 (ONCJ) at 8, 42
ACWS (3d) 562; Sutherland v R, 2003 FC 1516 at para 65; Swayze v Dafoe,
[2002] OJ No 3681 (ONCJ) at para 47, 116 ACWS (3d) 781.

91

See Office of the Correctional Investigator, Mortality Review Process, supra
note 27 at 17.

92

See Corrections and Conditional Release Act, supra note 3, s 86.
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should be achieved. It is also notable that the language does not emulate the
standards identified in international instruments.
In sum, CSC must match at least that which is available in community.
When the “professionally accepted standards” are higher than that, CSC
needs to meet those standards. Further, the level required by the independent duty of care must be met even if it is a higher level of services than available in the community or according to professionally accepted standards.
The health care standards CSC has set for itself cover the following areas
relevant to this paper: the process of requesting and providing health care,93
managing refusal to consent and involuntary treatment,94 and responding to
medical emergencies.95 The standards specific to palliative care are found
in the 2009 document Hospice Palliative Care Guidelines for Correctional
Service Canada.96 The policy documents regulating the provision of health
care are vague and frequently lack definitions for key terms (e.g., terminal
illness). The guidelines for palliative care are also relatively inaccessible –
they are available only through an Access to Information request.
The Hospice Palliative Care Guidelines recommend that palliative care
be assessed and provided on a case-by-case basis in prison, and that ideally
a team be available to address the needs and wishes of the incarcerated individual. The team potentially includes medical staff and spiritual care, and

93

See Correctional Service Canada, Health Services, Commissioner’s Directive
No 800 (Ottawa: CSC, 27 April 2015) at para 3, online: <www.csc-scc.gc.ca/
politiques-et-lois/800-cd-eng.shtml> [perma.cc/6GZE-EM98].

94

See Correctional Service Canada, Consent to Health Care Assessments, Treatment and Release of Information, Guideline 800-3 (Ottawa: CSC, 27 April
2015) at paras 4–6, 10, online: <www.csc-scc.gc.ca/acts-and-regulations/8003-gl-eng.shtml> [perma.cc/LR4W-FZXU] [Correctional Service Canada,
“Guideline 800-3”].

95

See Correctional Service Canada, Response to Medical Emergencies, Guideline 800-4 (Ottawa: CSC, 30 January 2017), online: <www.csc-scc.gc.ca/politiques-et-lois/800-4-gl-eng.shtml> [perma.cc/PK6Y-CRRW].

96

See Correctional Service Canada, Hospice Palliative Care Guidelines for Correctional Service Canada (Ottawa: CSC, 2009). It is worth noting here that,
unlike the other CSC policy documents relating to health care, this one is only
available through an Access to Information Act request. It is unknown why this
is the case.
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family members are to be involved “where possible.”97 When care cannot
be provided within the institution, arrangements are to be made to transfer
the incarcerated individual to the CSC regional hospital or to a community hospital.98 However, given the pervasiveness of permissive rather than
prescriptive language throughout the document, it has been argued that the
guidelines are essentially discretionary.99

2. In practice
In response to an Access to Information request filed with CSC in regard
to the availability and duration of palliative care, we received the following
response: “We can tell you that CSC has processes in place to respond to
end-of-life health care needs of offenders. Palliative care within CSC aims to
assist older/ palliative offenders in living their remaining time in comfort.”100
We were also told that more information could not be shared due to privacy
concerns.101 We therefore turned to independent research that has been conducted on health care in prisons generally and evidence from CSC data on
deaths in custody and attempted to draw some inferences and conclusions
from those sources about palliative care in correctional facilities.

a. Health care
Research conducted on health care in prisons provides evidence about
the delivery of health care that, while not specific to palliative care, has
obvious significant implications for the same. For example, the lack of suf-

97

Ibid at 17–19.

98

See ibid at 5.

99

We are grateful to one of the anonymous reviewers for this insight.
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Letter from Stephanie Brisson, Acting Director of Access to Information &
Privacy Division, Correctional Service Canada, to Dr Adelina Iftene, Schulich
School of Law, Dalhousie University (12 July 2018), responding to a request
under the Access to Information Act, RSC 1985, c A-1. It is worth noting here
that CSC seems to assume that palliative care is only for end of life, yet it is
well-established that patients can benefit from palliative care for months and
even years.

101
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ficient medical professionals across institutions leads to long wait times to
see physicians, even for urgent matters.102 Most institutions do not have a
nurse on site at all times.103 Interruptions to medication provision have been
regularly noted.104 Issues relating to the availability and administration of
medication are particularly relevant to palliative care.
There appears to be serious issues with respect to the availability of
appropriate medications, especially in relation to the management of pain,
which is of clear significance in the context of palliative care. The autonomy
of physicians to prescribe a course of treatment appears to be restricted due
to what the OCI has characterized as “ill-defined security, administrative,
or operational concerns.”105 The CSC National Drug Formulary106 provides
only a limited set of options for the management of chronic pain, and the
options that are available are not always the most efficacious form of treatment.107 Requests from physicians for drugs that are not on the formulary
are denied so often that physicians often stop prescribing anything other
than what the formulary permits.108 Tylenol 3 is often the only prescription
medication available.109 Morphine is only available in some institutions and,
even then, only sometimes.110 One study reported that, of 197 people, 62%
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See Correctional Service Canada, Document A 2017-0302 (Ottawa: CSC,
2018) obtained through an Access to Information Act request [Document A].
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See Iftene, “Pains of Incarceration”, supra note 13 at 73.
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See Kouyoumdjian, supra note 19 at 219; Office of the Correctional Investigator, Annual Report 2015, supra note 11 at 8.
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Office of the Correctional Investigator, Annual Report 2015, supra note 11 at 9.
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reported significant and constant pain.111 While most study participants were
receiving prescription medication, only 25% (50) of them reported that the
pain was managed satisfactorily.112
Prison rules that govern the administration of medications can also have
a negative impact on the management of pain. For example, in all prisons
where direct observation therapy is applied medication intake is supervised
for security reasons.113 Certain classes or dosages of medication simply cannot be used, regardless of how sick the individual is, how ineffective the
alternative treatment is,114 and regardless of the fact that this runs counter
to the principles of proper pain management which require “staying ahead
of the pain” through frequent dosages.115 In addition, in most institutions,
medication must be picked up in person by standing in line, sometimes for
an hour or two. In some institutions, lines form outside, regardless of the
weather.116 In one study, this was reported as the most common reason why
individuals on prescription medication did not to take their daily medication: their symptoms were too severe for standing in line, or the weather
was harsh.117

b. Deaths in custody
CSC has reported that between 2009–2010 and 2015–2016, 50% of
those who died natural (but not unexpected) deaths in custody received palliative care.118 Because of the broad definition of “death in custody”119, it is
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difficult to establish how many of these individuals were in a cell, the infirmary of a federal correctional facility, a federal correctional health facility
or a community hospital. Nor is it clear how many of those who did not receive palliative care could have benefited from it. It is also not clear for how
long they received palliative care. Nor is it clear whether the palliative care
that is being reported consisted solely of pain management or also included
the full range of palliative care interventions (e.g., drugs, acupuncture, and
counselling) to response to a host of symptoms that palliative care deals
with (e.g., nausea, breathlessness, and psychosocial suffering).
In a 2013 mortality review, CSC reported that of the 35 expected natural
deaths reviewed, 88% received palliative care.120 While 30 of the deaths
occurred in a CSC facility, 5 were found to be in a community hospital.121
There is no data indicating for how long the individuals received palliative
care nor any information pertaining to the the scope and quality of the care
received. The reviewer assessed that only 36% (11) of cases were handled
in a manner that adhered to professional standards and the final report specified that the general deficiencies pertained to form completion, filling DNR
orders, and a few of them presented problems in terms of timely access to
care, diagnosis, medication, counselling, and referrals.122 This 2013 CSC
mortality review was investigated by the OCI. For its investigation, the OCI
reviewed the same cases as CSC, and, subsequently, another 80 mortality
reports.123 The OCI investigators found significant issues in how those cases
were managed pre-death.124 The independent medical consultant who reviewed a subset of the mortality reports for the OCI concluded that, “in
nearly half (seven cases) the review of the health care records raised issues
regarding the quality of health care provided to the deceased inmates.”125
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Yet, the OCI notes, “[t]he mortality review reports for these cases simply
state that practices were in line with ‘applicable’ professional standards.”126
Significant issues were related to making the correct diagnosis (one imate’s
lung tumour was misdiagnosed for two years) and treatment (one inmate
was given a treatment contraindicated for his comorbidity).127 Documentation regarding the treatment of inmates was often incomplete and there was
generalized lack of progress notes or follow up information.128 The OCI also
criticized how data was recorded by CSC and how mortality reviews were
conducted.129 For instance, some patient files contained recommendations
for treatment but often lacked notes on whether the treatment was received
at all and whether it was successful. Where the treatment was not administered, a justification was also lacking. The OCI provides extensive examples
of such gaps.130 The inadequacy of data renders the assessement of the scope
and quality of health care provided, the establishment of factors that led to
the death of the individual, and the holding of individuals and institutions
accountable difficult.

3. Reflections and concerns
Based on the data provided above, there are good reasons to be concerned about the palliative care provided to federally incarcerated individuals, including: long wait times to see medical specialists; the cost of escorts
for delivery of care in community hospitals; the lack of full-time medical
staff in many prisons and CSC regional hospitals, restrictions on the ability
of physicians to prescribe appropriate medications, and barriers to appropriate delivery of medications.
The lack of comprehensive data on issues related to palliative care, the
lack of robust policy frameworks indicating which and how community
standards apply, the results from mortality review investigations, and the
general shortcomings of the prison health care system call into question
CSC’s statements that palliative care and pre-death care in its institutions
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meet “professionally accepted standards.”131 Succesful reform would include implementing:
•

A better system of monitoring and keeping records;

•

Strategies to find alternatives to incarceration for individuals receiving end-of-life care;

•

Law reform to stop release to the community for palliative care
from being contingent on factors outside the control of individuals
or irrelevant to the community’s safety; and

•

Policy and practice restructuring to improve palliative care in prisons for exceptional situations in which the person who could potentially benefit from it cannot or does not wish to be released into
the community.

B. Withholding and withdrawal of potentially life-sustaining care

1. Withholding and withdrawal of potentially life-sustaining
treatment (including artificial nutrition and hydration)
The CCRA and some internal policy documents regulate the issue of
consent to medical treatment as it applies to federally incarcerated individuals. According to section 88 of the CCRA, treatment should not be given to
an individual unless he or she has voluntarily consented to it.132 Furthermore,
any patient is entitled to refuse treatment at any time (whether such refusal
triggers the withholding of new treatment or the withdrawal of treatment already in place). However, the consent or refusal must be informed. Section
88(2) sets out the criteria for obtaining informed consent. The individual
must have the capacity to understand the consequences of their decision.
As well, he or she must be advised of the likelihood and degree of improvement, remission, control, or cure as a result of the treatment, degree of risk
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associated with the treatment, alternatives to the treatment, likely effects of
refusing the treatment, and the right to refuse or withdraw from treatment.133
Where a federally incarcerated individual is incapable, provincial and
territorial laws apply134 which means that a valid advance directive must be
followed or, if there is not one or the instruction directives are not valid in
the particular province or territory, consent must be sought from a substitute
decision maker. The basis for the decision making by the substitute decision
maker is generally the patient’s wishes if known, their beliefs and values if
wishes not known, and best interests if wishes, beliefs, and values are not
known.135
The Commissioner’s Guideline regarding Consent to Health Services
Assessment, Treatment and Release of Information,136 which is intended to
help with the implementation of the CCRA consent provision, is vague and
repetitive. It simply reiterates that the criteria for consent are set in the legislation, and that in cases of incapacity, provincial and territorial laws apply.
It does, however, note that verbal or written consent must be documented in
the health file of the patients. It also notes that where an individual refuses a
course of treatment, alternative options, if available, should be presented.137
There is very little case law dealing with the application of this legislation and of these policies and guidelines. Much of the case law seems to
deal with the imposition of mandated treatment on individuals as per supervision orders or with individuals detained against their will in psychiatric
facilities. There have been some challenges related to consent to psychiatric
treatment,138 consent to anti-androgen treatment of sex offenders (not for
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health reasons but to diminish risk),139 and consent to undergo a risk assessment (determined not to be the same as consent for health services).140 In
one Nova Scotia decision, the Court grappled with consent to the treatment
of a serious physical condition when an inmate was diagnosed with testicular cancer while incarcerated.141 The psychiatrist determined that the patient
was not capable of consenting to treatment. While in hospital, the patient
nonetheless refused to consent to the recommended surgery and brought a
claim to have the determinination as to their incapacity reviewed. The Court
found that the claimant could appreciate the consequences of their treatment
decision and the declaration of incapacity was revoked.
The very limited case law on the issue of the withholding or withdrawal
of medical treatment might lead one to conclude that the statutory provisions regarding the autonomy of an individual to refuse or withdraw from
life-sustaining treatment are being implemented. This appears to be supported by CSC reports on causes of deaths. For instance, in its last mortality
review, CSC noted that for all natural deaths that occurred between 2009–
2010 and 2015–2016, in 34% of cases, refusal or non-compliance with treatment was a “relevant event” in connection to death, while in 28% of cases,
information regarding compliance or non-compliance with treatment was
not available in the medical file.142 Unfortunately, details regarding what
“non-compliance” means (e.g., informed refusal of treatment, withdrawal
from treatment, failure to diligently follow treatment, etc.) is not available
in the CSC reports. It could, for example, mean that the person has autonomously rejected the treatment because they do not want it. However, it could
also mean that the person understands the poor quality of health care they
will receive and the hardships they will have to go through to get it and
so decides not to “comply.” As previously discussed, it has been reported
that incarcerated individuals on pain medication would regularly skip their
treatment because standing in line outside for a Tylenol 3 was not worth the
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effort it required, and it in fact, worsened the pain.143 This could be the case
with other medications as well.
To reiterate, the OCI has conducted extensive investigations in the last
few years on the mortality reviews conducted by CSC and in the medical
files of people who have died in custody. In 2013, the OCI noted the noncompliance issue: mortality reviews do not further investigate the causes
of “non-compliance” with treatment, whether general legal requirements
surrounding consent and refusal were respected, what was done to improve
compliance, or if alternative treatment was presented in accordance with the
governing legislation. The OCI found this omission troublesome, especially
in light of the fact that upon reviewing medical files for people who died,
they established that, at least in some cases, legal requirements concerning
consent were either clearly not met, or it could not be established whether
they had been met.144 For instance, in many files it was simply noted that
the “inmate did not show up for treatment” and this was treated as refusal.145
The health records did not distinguish between refusing to attend and being
unable to attend. There were also indications that in some cases, the nurse
did not attempt to obtain confirmation that refusal was of the patient’s own
volition. Finally, in some of the files indicating that the individual did not
receive treatment, there was no documentation regarding consent, refusal,
or withdrawal from treatment, as required by legislation.146
The OCI provides three examples where an incarcerated person’s refusal of treatment did not appear to meet fundamental legal requirements.
In the first example, the patient died of dementia and cancer. The impression given was that this individual was not capable of making end-of-life
decisions, and yet there was a signed DNR order and no mention of a legal
representative, family member, or substitute decision maker in the mortality
review.147 The second example is of a patient who died from lung cancer.
In their file, it was noted that they refused chest x-rays and thus subsequent treatment. The OCI notes that in the file, there were no follow-ups and
no progress reports. The individual had known mental health conditions.
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However, beyond the refusal notice, the file is silent about any information
provided to them regarding the consequences of their decision or whether
anything had been done to encourage or facilitate treatment.148 The third
example is a patient who died of tuberculosis after refusing any kind of
medical testing. The same issues were noted here as in the previous case.149
It is ultimately very difficult to evaluate how the common law principles
and statutory provisions related to consent and refusal of treatment are being implemented. Furthermore, based on the vague data from CSC and the
OCI’s reports, the apparent respect of a patient’s autonomy to refuse lifesustaining treatment is meaningless. On the contrary, the noted lack of progress reports and follow-up on patients, coupled with the concerns related to
the quality of health care and availability of services presented in the previous section, raise questions regarding the capacity of those refusing treatment. Thus, it is unclear if in all cases their decision was informed, whether
they truly had access to the treatment of their choice, and whether they even
had the physical ability to present themselves to the infirmary for the scheduled treatment. While it is entirely appropriate for the CSC legislation and
guidelines to require respect for capable people’s refusals of treatment, it is
also essential that they ensure that apparent refusals are actual refusals and
that refusals are voluntary and informed.

2. Voluntary stopping eating and drinking (VSED)
Neither the CCRA nor any policy documents or guidelines explicitly
address the issue of federally incarcerated individuals who refuse oral hydration and nutrition for the purpose of hastening death.150 Section 89 of the
CCRA prohibits force-feeding anyone who had the capacity to understand
the consequence of their decision at the time that they decided to fast.151 The
only policy document that addresses the refusal of food is Guideline 800-1
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Hunger Strikes: Managing an Inmate’s Death.152 However, a hunger strike
is defined by the Guideline as occurring when an incarcerated individual
declares himself or herself on a hunger strike and refuses all food and liquid
other than water for at least seven consecutive days.153 In such situations,
the Guideline requires that the incarcerated individual be observed by the
nurse, their health be monitored with their consent, and efforts be made to
negotiate the requests that motivated the hunger strike.154 When the individual loses consciousness or the ability to consent, CSC is not only permitted,
but required to intervene in order to preserve life.155 How this intervention
squares with section 89 of the CCRA is unclear. For our purposes, this arguably does not matter as the Hunger Strike Guideline would not apply to
VSED cases as under the definition provided within the Guideline, VSED
is not a hunger strike.
There are few relevant court cases that provide guidance on prison authorities’ duties (and none on CSC’s specifically) when a person decides to
stop eating or drinking, for whatever reason, but even fewer that deal with
the specific issue of a person trying to hasten death. In British Columbia v
Astaforoff156, a 1983 decision of the BC Supreme Court, the Court ruled on
a request from the BC Attorney General to provide an order compelling the
provincial correctional authority to force-feed an individual. The Court established that the individual was attempting suicide and that their health was
rapidly declining. The Court determined that while correctional authorities
have a duty under the Criminal Code to provide incarcerated individuals
with the necessaries of life, it does not have a duty to force those necessaries
upon those who refuse them.157 It also ruled that while aiding or encouraging
suicide is a crime, standing by and not intervening is not a crime.158 The BC
Supreme Court thus decided that when the individual is lucid, they cannot
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be compelled to eat. The Court noted that the ruling may be different when
the individual loses capacity but left this as an open question.159
A subsequent case, Burke v Prince Edward Island160, dealt with the
other side of the coin: the entitlement of prison authorities to intervene.
The Applicant, an inmate by the name of Burke was transferred to a hospital after refusing food and hydration in an attempt to commit suicide. The
hospital was planning to force-feed Burke and he applied to the court for
an order pursuant to section 24 of the Charter, that force-feeding would
violate his section 7 rights under the same. The Court decided that while
such a right may exist, there was not enough evidence before it and so it was
not prepared to make such a declaration.161 However, it also ruled, applying Astaforoff, that there was no statutory or common law duty to keep the
patient alive against his will.162 The Court went a step further and concluded
that it is unlikely that the state has an entitlement to keep an incarcerated
individual alive. While the Court refused to provide an order prohibiting
force-feeding, it stated that if they proceed, they must accept whatever liability may befall them as a result of their actions carried out without the
applicant’s consent.163
Thus, it seems clear that an incarcerated individual refusing oral nutrition and hydration, for whatever reason, cannot be force-fed or treated as
long as he or she maintains the capacity to consent. It also appears, according to the language of the CCRA, that force-feeding is not an option, even
after the individual loses capacity, so long as they were capable at the time
the decision to fast was made and had not declared a hunger strike.
There is no data or other information on how often, if at all, VSED has
been attempted by individuals who are federally incarcerated,164 what the
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response to it was, or how it was monitored. It is difficult to believe, considering the large number of individuals with serious illnesses, the questionable
quality of health services, and the lack of options for release, that VSED is
not attempted on occasion. Given the problematic monitoring of medical
treatment, progress notes, consent and refusal of treatment discussed in the
previous section, it is reasonable to wonder how long it would take authorities to notice when someone is attempting VSED. It is unclear how and
whether authorities would document the attempt, whether authorities would
endeavour to make the patient comfortable while doing so, and whether
they would contact next of kin. It is also reasonable to wonder what, if any,
efforts would be made to find alternatives to incarceration for individuals
who indicate their intentions and begin VSED.
A number of questions and concerns arise from the preceding review of
the law and practice with respect to VSED for federally incarcerated individuals. For example, is it or will it be used as an alternative to MAiD when
MAiD is unavailable or not desired by the individual? Do incarcerated individuals have meaningful alternatives to VSED (i.e., treatment with tolerable
side effects)? Do prisons have physicians and nurses with the clinical competencies required to care for an individual dying through VSED? Protocols
for VSED are needed but absent.

C. Palliative sedation
Palliative sedation is “the intentional administration of sedative medication to reduce a patient’s level of consciousness, with the intent to alleviate suffering at the end of life. It includes both intermittent and continuous
sedation, as well as both superficial and deep sedation. It may be accompanied by the withdrawal of artificial hydration and nutrition.”165 Palliative
sedation accompanied by artificial hydration and nutrition will not hasten
death. However, when artificial hydration and nutrition is withheld, it can,

category (which includes hanging, cutting, asphyxiation and ligature). Also,
under “events related to the suicide” there is a category by the name of “people
suffering of chronic conditions (physical),” 55% of whom committed suicide
between 2009–2010 and 2015–2016. There is no explanation as to what this
means and why the chronic conditions were deemed relevant. Given the appearance of VSED outside prisons, CSC would be well advised to start tracking it, if they are not already doing so.
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in some circumstances, hasten death. Palliative sedation without artificial
hydration and nutrition (PSs̄ ANH) can be divided into three types: PSs̄ ANH
that will not hasten death (Type 1); might, but is not certain to hasten death
(Type 2); or is certain to hasten death (Type 3). Type 1 occurs when death is
anticipated within approximately 24–48 hours, Type 2 occurs when death is
anticipated within approximately 14 days, and Type 3 occurs when death is
not anticipated for at least 14 days.166
There is no data on, or guidelines for palliative sedation in CSC facilities. As with any other type of death in custody other than MAiD (which is
defined in section 241.1 of the Criminal Code), the use of palliative sedation
would be followed by a mortality review. However, none of the public mortality reports mention any kind of palliative sedation as a cause of death.
Again, a series of questions and concerns arise. Is palliative sedation
being used as an alternative to MAiD when MAiD is unavailable or not
desired by the individual? Do federally incarcerated individuals have access to palliative sedation and alternatives to palliative sedation? Do CSC
physicians and nurses have clinical competencies needed to provide palliative sedation? Do CSC regional hospitals have the physical and human
resources infrastructure necessary to provide palliative sedation? Protocols
for palliative sedation are needed but absent.

D. Medical Assistance in Dying (MAiD)
In February 2015, the Supreme Court of Canada held in Carter v Canada (AG)167 that the Criminal Code prohibitions on medical assistance in
dying violate the Charter:
[I]nsofar as they prohibit physician-assisted death for a competent adult person who (1) clearly consents to the termination
of life; and (2) has a grievous and irremediable medical condition (including an illness, disease or disability) that causes
enduring suffering that is intolerable to the individual in the
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circumstances of his or her condition. ‘Irremediable’, [they
added]…, does not require the patient to undertake treatments
that are not acceptable to the individual.168

On 17 June 2016, the Parliament of Canada passed and brought into
force An Act to amend the Criminal Code and to make related amendments
to other Acts (medical assistance in dying).169 This amendment to the Criminal Code established the federal statutory framework for MAiD in Canada.
The eligibility criteria encompasses individuals who are:
•

Eligible for health services funded by government in Canada (or
would be but for minimum period of residence or waiting period);

•

At least 18 years old;

•

Capable of making decisions with respect to their health;

•

Made a voluntary request;

•

Gave informed consent to receive medical assistance in dying after
having been informed of means available to relieve suffering, including palliative care;

•

Have a grievous and irremediable medical condition, meaning:
– They have a serious and incurable illness or disability;
– They are in an advanced state of irreversible decline;
– That illness or state of decline causes them enduring physical or
psychological suffering that is intolerable to them and that cannot
be relieved under conditions that they consider acceptable; and
– Their natural death has become reasonably foreseeable, without a
prognosis necessarily having been made as to the specific length of
time that they have remaining.170
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Section 19(1.1) of the CCRA states that the definition of MAiD as applicable to incarcerated people is the same as the one provided in section 241.1
of the Criminal Code.171 Section 19, which requires a mortality review after each death in custody, also specifically exempts deaths in custody that
occurred as a result of MAiD from mortality reviews (although they are
subject to quality management review).172 The implementation of MAiD for
federally incarcerated individuals was left to CSC to determine.
CSC released their MAiD policy at the end of November 2017.173 According to the policy, a federally incarcerated individual seeking MAiD
must submit a request to the institution’s Health Services. Within five days
of submitting the request, they will be seen by the institutional physician or
nurse practitioner, who will provide them with information regarding MAiD
and schedule an assessment. The patient must sign a consent form for eligibility assessment in front of two independent witnesses.174 After that, within seven days, the individual will undergo the first eligibility assessment
conducted by the prison physician or the nurse practitioner. The individual
cannot chose their assessor nor seek a second opinion if the institutional
assessor believes the eligibility criteria are not met. However, if the first
assessor believes the criteria are met, the individual will undergo a second
assessment conducted by an external physician or nurse practitioner in the
community.175 If both assessors are of the opinion that the criteria are met,
then the individual will be provided with the procedure after the required 10
day waiting period (or less if death or the loss of capacity is imminent). This
MAiD policy appears to only contemplate the second assessment taking
place in the community176 and it,
assume[s] that the MAID procedure will be completed external to CSC, namely, in a community hospital or health care
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facility. In exceptional circumstances, at the request of the inmate, a Treatment Centre or a Regional Hospital may be used,
provided:
a.

an exception has been approved by the Assistant Commissioner, Health Services, and

b. the procedure includes a health professional external to
CSC.177

It is not clear whether all institutions that might have individuals who desire
and qualify for MAiD have the infrastructure to bring in a second assessor or
MAiD provider who is not a prison physician. Finally, no provision appears
to have been made for individuals who are too ill or do not wish to transfer
out of the prison for the second assessment and provision of MAiD. As
the debate over forced transfers out of publicly-funded faith-based institutions has illuminated, some patients cannot be transferred without suffering
extreme distress and without the risk of losing of capacity (which, in turn,
means the person will have lost eligibility for MAiD).178 Furthermore, some
individuals may prefer to receive their end-of-life care within the correctional facility. For instance, some people have been in prison for decades,
and the people closest to them are individuals incarcerated with them. They
may thus wish to be with them in their final moments. The OCI refers to
five incarcerated individuals who chose not to submit a request for parole
by exception, explaining that “their wish was to remain at a CSC facility for
their end of life care.”179 However, there is no information about these cases
and so it is difficult to assess how reasonable it is to conclude that they did
not wish to be transferred out of the prison.
We turn now from a review of the law and guidelines to what takes place
in practice. In October 2017, we filed a request through Access to Information with CSC, asking for the number of MAiD requests and how they have
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been addressed since the policy has been in place. Though CSC is statutorily
required to send the information within 30 days from when the request was
received,180 no documents were received within the 30 days. Additionally,
we were not provided with a justification for the delay.181 The response to repeated phone calls made to inquire about the status of the request was, “this
is sensitive information/has low statistics and has not been yet approved
for release.”182 Finally, on 7 July 2018, nine months after our request was
made, we received information on the number of MAiD requests, but not
our requested elaboration on the decision-making process regarding MAiD
requests. According to the information CSC provided, at the time of the Access to Information request, there had been eight requests for MAiD. Only
one person, who was already in a community hospital, was deemed eligible
for MAiD, and they died before the procedure was provided.183
According to a CBC report on 25 February 2018: “CSC told CBC News
it has received eight requests related to MAiD and, to date, three inmates
have been approved for medically assisted death – though not all three have
completed the procedure. Two of the inmates were already living in the
community.”184
The OCI 2017-2018 Annual Report, published on 29 June 2018, contains a discussion of “the first case of medical assistance in dying in federal
corrections.”185 The Report details that,
•

The inmate was on palliative care for more than a year, suffering
from a terminal illness.
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•

The Case Management Team started to work on a section 121 application for parole by exception (compassionate release) shortly after
terminal diagnosis. The request was rejected by the Parole Board of
Canada one year later.

•

The inmate requested medical assistance in dying at a Regional
Hospital under CSC’s authority, with a physician who was under
contract with CSC. It is unclear if the inmate chose MAID because
he was refused compassionate release.

•

Two evaluations took place, and the inmate met MAID criteria. The
physician who conducted the evaluations was not under contract
with CSC.

•

A date was chosen by the inmate, and family members were permitted to visit him at the CSC Regional Hospital on a number of occasions in advance of the procedure.

•

On the chosen day, the inmate was escorted to an external community hospital by two armed correctional officers in an adapted
medical transport. The inmate was restrained. Once in the hospital
room, the restraints were removed. The inmate was left in the room
with pre-approved family members.

•

According to CSC reporting, the officers providing security escort
waited “at the back, near the entrance.” (Note: the wording in CSC’s
report is not clear as to whether the officers stayed in the room or
just outside the room.)

•

According to CSC, “the physician who performed the procedure,
while under contract with CSC when he conducted the original assessment, was operating as an employee of the hospital in which the
procedure took place, and not as a CSC physician.186

This review of the law and practice with respect to MAiD yet again raises
questions and concerns.
First, the inconsistency between the information released by the CSC in
response to our Access to Information Request, the information reported by
CBC, and the information reported by the OCI is disturbing.
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Second, the OCI’s description of the first case of MAiD indicates that
there were “two evaluations” of eligibility and indicates that a single physician provided “the evaluations” of eligibility.187 There is no report of an
independent practitioner providing the second assessment. If only one physician provided both of the two required assessments of eligibility, then the
Criminal Code was clearly violated. The CSC is reported as having said
“the physician who performed the procedure, while under contract with
CSC when he conducted the original assessment, was operating as an employee of the hospital in which the procedure took place, and not as a CSC
physician.”188 The CSC Guideline on Medical Assistance in Dying requires
that the physician or nurse practitioner who actually provides the MAiD
must be “a health professional external to CSC.”189 It is clear that the physician who provided MAiD was the institutional physician for the purposes
of at least the initial eligibility assessment. It is therefore unreasonable to
claim that he was “external to CSC”190 when he provided MAiD. “External
to CSC” does not mean physical location (i.e., being out of the prison) or
the wearing of an external hat by someone who also wears an internal hat. It
therefore appears that the CSC Guideline may have been breached.
Third, individuals may be denied parole by exception but be eligible
for MAiD. The CSC guidelines encourages that all release options be considered prior to MAiD.191 However, there has been no reform to the current
parole by exception rules and practices. As noted in the OCI Report from
2017, the criteria for MAiD and those to be released into community are
not aligned, and some people may be eligible for MaiD but not be granted
parole by exception.192 This is because eligiblility for MAiD only requires
that natural death has become reasonably foreseeable without the necessity for a prognosis for a specific length of time. In fact, since the legislation was passed, a few individuals who suffer from an incurable grievous
and irremediable condition (which does not have to be terminal) who have
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reached an advanced state of irreversible decline have been granted MAiD
even though their deaths were estimated to be a number of years in the
future. For example, a 79-year-old woman with advanced excruciatingly
painful osteoarthritis was deemed eligible for MAiD.193 Yet, as discussed
above, people who are serving a life or indeterminate sentence cannot even
be considered for parole by exception unless they are terminally ill. In addition, even people with clearly terminal conditions can be denied release
because of issues that are of little relevance to health (such as prior attitudes
during incarceration, completion of programs, etc.). If temporary absence
and the Royal Prerogative of Mercy are also not available, the OCI’s concern that MAiD may become the default option for individuals who meet
all of the MAiD criteria but cannot get released into community for health
care seems valid.194
Fourth, it may not be feasible to provide palliative or other end-of-life
care in community (because of a lack of beds or the cost of security escorts)
yet feasible to provide MAiD in the community (a person may need days or
weeks in a community hospital for the former versus less than a day for the
latter). This may create a troubling incentive to request MAiD.
Fifth, the CSC MAiD policy is not consistent with the federal MAiD
legislation. For example, the fact the patient is not entitled to a second assessment if the institutional assessor believes the criteria are not met, is
problematic.
Finally, there may be logistical difficulties in bringing the second medical or nurse practitioner into prisons for the exceptional circumstance when
transfer to community is not permitted (e.g., when parole by exception is
denied) or possible (e.g., when there is a lack of facilities in community
or it is impossible to move the person without risking significant suffering
or loss of capacity). If these issues are not resolved, federally incarcerated
individuals will be denied a medical service to which they are entitled and
which the CSC has a legal obligation to provide.
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Conclusion
At least three conclusions can be drawn from the review we have provided. First, research surrounding the number of inmates seeking palliative
care, refusing treatment, undergoing VSED, asking for palliative sedation or
MAiD, and the institutional practices related to these issues is desperately
needed. The sparse data available paints a grim picture and raises questions regarding the level of medical care and expertise available, consent
and capacity, and the standard of care provided with respect to diagnosis
and treatment.
Second, CSC needs to create a more adequate system of monitoring
and keeping records about the people wanting end-of-life care, and the care
they receive. The lack of publicly available information, the gaps in recordkeeping noted by the OCI, and the obfuscatory attitude CSC has shown
when asked to produce information through Access to Information requests,
intensify the concerns related to how CSC is discharging its legal obligations under criminal, correctional, and health laws. The lack of research
and consistent CSC information prevent CSC from being held accountable
for their practices, and hinder attempts to engage in concrete conversations
about reform.
Third, even from the sparse data available, it appears that CSC and the
PBC should undergo significant reforms to adequately address the health
needs and desires of seriously ill individuals. As a starting point, they should
focus on the following:
–

Developing new alternatives to incarceration for individuals approaching the end of their lives;

–

Implementing a mechanism for priority screening and rapid assessments of requests for release on medical grounds (failure to review
and respond to requests in a timely fashion where there are alternatives to incarceration, renders them inaccessible);

–

Reducing the importance of considerations that are either outside
the control of the individual or are irrelevant to the issue of the
safety of the community (such procedures and practices make the
existing alternatives to incarceration inaccessible) in the determination of parole by exception for end-of-life care;

–

Reforming the legislation and policies that govern the provision of
health care in prisons in order to align their standards with those of
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the Canada Health Act and to impose the same level of ethical and
professional obligations to which health professionals are held in
the community;
–

Improving palliative care within prisons for the exceptional situations where the person is not released to the community;

–

Ensuring that refusals of potentially life-sustaining treatment in
prisons are informed and voluntary and that said treatment is meaningfully accessible even where refused;

–

Developing protocols for VSED and palliative sedation;

–

Establishing a mechanism through which an individual who is serving life or an indeterminate sentence but who is not terminally ill
can seek parole by exception for end-of-life care;

–

Ensuring that the second assessment and MAiD can be provided
within the prison in the exceptional circumstance that the individual
wishes to remain within the correctional facility or where transfer
is not possible (because of a lack of facilities in the community or
due to risk to the health of the transferee). However, the aim should
be to avoid such situations as much as possible by improving the
release mechanisms and ensuring that individuals return to the community before such extreme circumstances are reached.

